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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is a successive, capital post-conviction case raising claims of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel based upon federal constitutional claims that were omitted from Dunlap's
consolidated appeal. Also included are the federal constitutional claims as independent claims.
Dunlap appeals the district court (hereinafter referred to as the "PCR court") decision denying
relief.
B. Course of the Proceedings

The relevant proceedings prior to this action include Dunlap's 2006 resentencing
proceeding's direct appeal. A jury sentenced Dunlap to death on February 22, 2006. The State
Appellate Public Defender's Office ("SAPD") substituted as counsel ofrecord. Pursuant to
Idaho's Special Proceedings in Capital Cases, the direct appeal was stayed until completion of
the post-conviction relief action. Summary dismissal of the petition was granted in the state's
favor on November 24, 2009. R. 12. In a consolidated appeal, Dunlap challenged both the
judgment, conviction and the summary dismissal of his claims for post-conviction relief. The
opening brief was lodged with this Court on February 25, 2011, and was subsequently accepted
and filed on March 22, 2011. R. 936-1048. On April 7, 2011, the underlying petition in this
action alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was filed. R. 10-53. The State filed its
motion for summary dismissal on May 21, 2012. R. 1291-1366. The State conceded that the
petition was timely filed as to the appellate IAC claims, but argued that the petition was untimely
as to the underlying substantive claims. R. 1301, 1304-05. The PCR court agreed with the State,
finding the appellate IAC claims timely, but the underlying substantive claims untimely. R.
2262, 2265-66. The petition was summarily dismissed on May 8, 2013. R. 2255-2337. The
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final judgment was entered on May 13, 2013. R. 2338. Dunlap timely appealed on June 10,
2013. R. 2340.
C. Concise Statement of the Facts

The Appellate IAC claims are based upon the trial record. Many of the claims challenge
appellate counsel's failure to raise legal challenges to instructions or the application of statutes in
Dunlap's case. One claim raises a three-part challenge to the capital voir dire. The relevant
facts are set out below.
The selection process began with a written questionnaire. Each potential juror completed
the questionnaire prior to the voir dire proceeding.' Numerous questions asked the jurors about
opinions on the propriety of the death penalty. See, e.g., R.1909-16.
The selection process then moved to a general voir dire that lasted less than four hours.
R. 1605, 1734. Individual voir dire then began, but was limited by the resentencing court to five
minutes per side with eachjuror. Dunlap v. State, 313 P.3d at 20 ("Dunlap V"), #32773, Tr. Vol.
02, Jury V02 2 • The jury was picked in a little over a day and a half, with about 6 and one half
hours of individual voir dire. 3 Pertinent responses of individual venire persons are discussed in
the relevant issue on appeal.

The questionnaires fromjurors who sat on Dunlap's jury or questionnaires that are otherwise
relevant to this appeal are in Questionnaire Vol. 6, and were attached as Exhibit 2 to the
Amended Petition for Post-conviction Relief. R. 1814-2148.
2 The PCR court granted the petitioner's motion to take judicial notice of the prior proceedings.
R. 1053-54. A separate Motion to Take Judicial Notice is filed with this Court
contemporaneously with the filing of this Brief.
3 General voir dire and voir dire of the individual jurors who are relevant to this appeal are
contained in the voir dire transcripts and were attached for the court's convenience as Exhibit 1
to the Amended Petition for Post-conviction Relief. R. 1602-1813.
1
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Whether each underlying substantive claim that is the subject of each ineffective
assistance on appeal claim may be considered on the merits?
B. Whether Dunlap was denied federal constitutional rights when appellate counsel omitted
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment rights to
an impartial jury and effective assistance of counsel, that: (1) the resentencing court erroneously
applied Witherspoon v. Illinois and improperly excluded a juror for cause; (2) the resentencing
court failed to exclude numerous jurors who were substantially impaired under Morgan v.
Illinois; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective, under Strickland v. Washington, in conducting voir
dire resulting in a biased jury composed of substantially impaired jurors and an improper
exclusion for cause of a qualified juror?
C. Whether the preliminary jury instructions unconstitutionally restricted voir dire?
D. Whether the propensity instruction given to the jury was vague and ambiguous under the
Eighth Amendment and also resulted in a violation of The Due Process Clause?
E. Whether the weighing instruction and verdict form lessened the State's burden of proof in
violation of federal Ex-Post Facto and Due Process protections?

III.

STANDARD FOR REVIEW

A. Procedural Review
A post-conviction action is a special proceeding, civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, 104
Idaho 676, 678 (1983), Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724 (2008). The petitioner has the
burden of proving the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. Stuart v.
State, 118 Idaho 865, 869 (1990).
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When considering summary dismissal, "dismissal is permissible only when the
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, ifresolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the reliefrequested." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho
548, 561 (2008). This Court exercises free review over questions of law. Rhoades v. State, 148
Idaho 247,250 (2009).
B. Appellate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The governing law on the right to counsel on appeal is well established. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, criminal defendants have a right to
counsel on appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 388 (1985). "A defendant is constitutionally
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on a direct appeal as of right." Mitchell v. State,
132 Idaho 274,277 (1998) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. at 394).
The Strickland v. Washington standard is the proper standard for evaluating appellate
ineffective assistance claims. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). An ineffective
appellate counsel claim requires proof of deficient performance and prejudice. Id. at 285-86,
Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277. Counsel's performance must fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness sufficient to show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the
result would have been different." Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277 (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984)).
Appellate counsel can provide ineffective assistance under the Strickland standard when
counsel omits a particular claim. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel exists when
"ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented." Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288
(quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1985)). Other courts, in applying Strickland
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to this type of claim, look to the strength of the omitted claim rather than reviewing counsel's
performance on the presented claims.
One of the first appellate courts to apply the "firmly established" right to appellate
counsel was the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The circuit applied the
two-prong analysis of Strickland to a claim that appellate counsel omitted issues on appeal.

Gray, 800 F.2d at 646. The circuit recognized that a reviewing court should evaluate appellate
counsel's choice of issues on appeal, not simply review the issues presented. Id.
Had appellate counsel failed to raise a significant and obvious issue, the failure
could be viewed as deficient performance. If an issue which was not raised may
have resulted in a reversal of the conviction, or an order for a new trial, the failure
was prejudicial. Were it legitimate to dismiss a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on appeal solely because we found it improper to review appellate
counsel's choice of issues, the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal
would be worthless.

Id.
Giving further guidance, the court stated that a reviewing court must determine whether
"appellate counsel failed to present significant and obvious issues on appeal. Significant issues
which could have been raised should then be compared to those which were raised. Generally,
only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of
effective assistance of counsel be overcome." Gray, 800 F.2d at 646. See also Page v. United

States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1989) ("counsel could be constitutionally deficient in
omitting a dead-bang winner even while zealously pressing other strong (but unsuccessful)
claims.").
This application of Strickland - examining the merits of the omitted claim - has been
adopted in other circuits. Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995). The Tenth
Circuit has also held that "an appellate advocate may deliver deficient performance and prejudice
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a defendant by omitting a 'dead-bang winner,' even though counsel may have presented strong
but unsuccessful claims on appeal." United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1995)
(citing Page, 884 F.2d at 302). While not precisely defined, "the phrase 'dead-bang winner' ...
is an issue which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted in
a reversal on appeal." Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d at 1515, n. 13 (citing Cook, 45 F.3d at 395).
Meritorious claims are not "amenable to being winnowed out of an otherwise strong brief."

Banks, 54 F.3d at 1515. Failing to raise such claims constitutes ineffective assistance on appeal.

Id.
IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The Underlying Substantive Claims Were Erroneously Dismissed Under§ 19-2719
In asserting claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising various
issues, Dunlap also raised an underlying substantive issue for each appellate IAC claim. R.
1562. The PCR court found that the underlying substantive issues were waived under LC. § 192719, because they should have been raised in the direct appeal or the first post-conviction
petition immediately following the re-sentencing proceeding. R. 2260.
Dunlap acknowledges that these claims could have been raised in the direct appeal, and
that any failure to raise them therein may operate to waive the claims under§ 19-2719(5). The
only basis or excuse that Dunlap asserts for raising them in the successive petition in this case is
that appellate counsel was limited on appeal by the page limits imposed by this Court. Dunlap
argues that in a consolidated appeal of the re-sentencing and denial of post-conviction relief in
the capital case of first impression for jury sentencing in Idaho, that the imposition of a 100 page
limit violated due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and precluded appellate counsel
from raising the substantive issues and exhausting them for federal habeas corpus review. U.S.
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CONST. amend. XIV. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (for federal habeas
review, claims must be presented to the state supreme court). This Court's page limit for the
consolidated appeal of the criminal judgment and the post-conviction relief action impeded
Dunlap's ability to pursue all issues in the state courts. Given the preclusive effect of that
limitation on Dunlap's ability to appeal all meritorious issues and later seek federal habeas
corpus relief on the omitted claims, this Court's page limitation in the consolidated appeal
operated to deny effective counsel on appeal and, as to the omitted claims, constituted an
independent federal due process violation. U.S. CONST. amends. VI and XIV.
B. Appellate Counsel Omitted Meritorious Issues Addressing Violations of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments As a Result of Errors by the Court and Counsel
During Voir Dire
1. Governing Law on Juror Impairment
"It is well settled that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee a defendant on trial for

his life the right to an impartial jury." Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988); Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). Impartiality means "a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent'
jurors", Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 722, that is, a jury comprised of "nothing more than 'jurors
who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts."' Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162,
178 ( 1986). The right to an impartial jury entitles a criminal defendant to "a verdict of
conviction or acquittal ... given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair." Powers v.

Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,413 (1991). "Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the
case solely on the evidence before it." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
"[T]he decision whether a man deserves to live or die must be made on scales that are not
deliberately tipped toward death." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.20 (1968).
Accordingly, in capital cases, the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is violated
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whenever a jury is empaneled that is "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die." Id. at
521. An improper, death-prone jury exists when jurors who can conscientiously find the facts
and make the statutorily mandated choice between life and death are erroneously excluded
because of initially expressed reluctance to impose the death penalty. Such a jury also exists
when jurors are permitted to serve despite pro-death biases that substantially impair their ability
to consider mitigating evidence or impose a life sentence.
Critical to the guarantee of the right to an impartial jury "is an adequate voir dire to
identify unqualified jurors." Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992); Dennis v. United

States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950); Morfordv. United States, 339 U.S. 258,259 (1950). Voir
dire "plays a critical function" in protecting this right because "[w]ithout an adequate voir dire
the trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to
follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled." Rosales-Lopez v.

United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (White, J., plurality opinion), quoted in Morgan, 504
U.S. at 730-31.
It has long been established that jurors should be excused for cause if they harbor a bias
towards death that impairs their ability to follow the law in capital sentencing proceedings. As
early as 1919, the Supreme Court stated that jurors who would automatically impose a death
sentence because they "were in favor of nothing less than capital punishment in cases of
conviction for murder in the first degree" were unqualified to serve in a capital case and a
challenge for cause should have been sustained. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 20-21
(1919).
A half-century later, the Court noted this point again in Witherspoon. Witherspoon's
principal holding was that the exclusion of potential jurors based solely on generalized
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opposition to capital punishment violated the Sixth Amendment. But, the Court recognized that
a juror's views on the death penalty, whether for or against, were relevant to his qualification to
serve. The Court concluded that permitting "a juror who felt it his 'duty' to sentence every
convicted murderer to death ... to serve ... 'while those who admitted to scruples against capital
punishment were dismissed without further interrogation'" was a '"double standard' [that]
'inevitably resulted in [the] denial of due process."' Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.20 (quoting

Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 303-04 (4th Cir. 1968) and citing Stroud).
In the 1980s, the Court decided three more cases making clear that questions of lifequalification presented nothing new, unequivocally holding that jurors who would automatically
impose a death sentence must be excused for cause; that death-qualification and life-qualification
are part of the same inquiry; and that the inquiry into both of these forms of exclusions for juror
bias in capital sentencing are a subset of the general rule of law that governs exclusions for juror
bias in every other setting. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412 (1984); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
The Court granted certiorari in Adams v. Texas to answer the question of "whether Texas
contravened the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed and applied in Witherspoon ...
when it excluded members of the venire from jury service because they were unable to take an
oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life would not 'affect [their]
deliberations on any issue of fact.'" Adams, 448 U.S. at 40 (internal citation omitted). The
Court held that the Texas statute was inconsistent with its holding in Witherspoon and struck
down the statute.

Adams recognized that a potential juror's inability to return a verdict of life as well as the
inability to return a verdict of death were equally relevant considerations. The Court recognized
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that while it was likely fewer jurors would automatically impose death than those who could
never impose death, jurors who were biased towards death would nevertheless be subject to a
defense challenge for cause. Adams, 448 U.S. at 49.
In Wainwright v. Witt, the Court expressly reaffirmed the legal standard announced in

Adams. The Court held that "the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may
be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's
views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in

accordance with his instructions and his oath."' Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added)
(quoting Adams, U.S. 448 at 45). Because there was "nothing talismanic" about juror exclusion
simply because a case involved capital sentencing, and the Adams standard employed the
"traditional reasons" for determining juror bias, id. at 423, a juror who could not vote for life,
just as a juror who could not vote for death, would be excused for cause because "the juror's
views 'would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" Id. at 424.
In 1988, Chief Justice Rehnquist, citing Witherspoon, held that a juror who would not
consider a life sentence was unqualified to serve in a capital case. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
81 (1988). In Ross, a potential juror stated during voir dire that if the jury found the defendant
guilty, "he would vote to impose death automatically." Id. at 83-84. The trial court denied a
defense challenge for cause. Defense counsel had peremptory strikes remaining and used one to
challenge the juror. The Ross Court specifically held that automatically voting for death - just as
automatically voting for life - would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror," and thus the trial court erred in denying the challenge for cause. Id. at 85. The
availability and use of a peremptory challenge by the defense, however, rendered the error
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harmless. The Court unequivocally stated: "Had [the challenged juror] sat on the jury that
ultimately sentenced petitioner to death, and had petitioner properly preserved his right to
challenge the trial court's failure to remove [the juror] for cause, the sentence would have to be
overturned." Id. (citing Adams). Not only did the Ross Court affirm the validity of lifequalifying questions, it also recognized that the Adams standard - which the Court had stated in
1984 governed "any situation where a party seeks to exclude a biased juror," Witt, 469 U.S. at
423 (emphasis added)- compelled its holding. Ross, 487 U.S. at 85-86.
In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), the Supreme Court repeated its views
regarding "life-qualifying" a juror. The Court reversed the defendant's death penalty because the
trial court denied the defendant's request to ask "If you found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you
automatically vote to impose the death penalty?" Morgan, 504 U.S. at 723. The Morgan Court
explained that a juror who "will automatically vote for the death penalty without regard to the
mitigating evidence" is biased because that juror has expressed "an intention not to follow the
instructions to consider the mitigating evidence and to decide if it is sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty." Id. at 738. "[S]uch a juror will not give mitigating evidence
the consideration that the statute contemplates," id., is not impartial, and should be excused for
cause. See also id. at 738-39 (a factfinder who would "impose the death penalty without regard
to the nature or extent of mitigating evidence ... is refusing in advance to follow the statutory
direction to consider that evidence"). It was proper - indeed constitutionally necessary - to
remove for cause "(a]ny juror to whom mitigating factors are ... irrelevant," id. at 739 (emphasis
added), and that a capital defendant must be allowed the opportunity to ferret out those
prospective jurors who "had predetermined the terminating issue of his trial, that being whether
to impose the death penalty." Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
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Although life-qualification is often discussed in terms of excluding jurors who would
automatically impose a death penalty, Morgan's statement that such a juror "will fail in good
faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions
require him to do", id. at 742 (emphasis omitted), makes clear that automatic opposition to a life
sentence is sufficient but not necessary to exclude a juror for cause. Any substantial impairment
in the juror's ability to properly consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances as the instructions and the law requires mandates that the juror be excused for
cause.
As noted above, an adequate voir dire is required to preserve a defendant's right to a fair
and impartial jury. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729; see also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182, 188 (1981); Dennis, 339 U.S. at 171-72; Morford, 339 U.S. at 259. Thus, a voir dire
aimed at uncovering the terminating issue of the trial is required for the government and the
defendant to gather the information needed to exercise juror challenges - peremptory and cause in an intelligent and informed manner. It is also necessary to ensure that the Court has sufficient
information to determine whether the prospective juror is qualified to serve. 4 See Morgan, 504
U.S. at 729-730; Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,431 (1991).
The question of excludable pro-death bias under Morgan and Ross applies at each step in
the decision-making process that implicates the juror's willingness and ability to consider and

An adequate voir dire was precluded by the trial court's limitation of individual voir dire to five
minutes. That limitation violated Dunlap's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amends. VI and XIV. See, e.g.,
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729-30. However, that issue was raised by appellate counsel, and this Court
has already decided it, albeit erroneously. Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 19-20. Accordingly, the time
limitation is not raised as an issue. The time limit on voir dire is discussed to the extent that the
limited voir dire is intertwined with, or contributed to, the unconstitutional jury selection
process, as noted here, and below, by counsel, R. 1408, and the trial court, R. 2309.
4
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give mitigating effect to constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. E.g., Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982) (the sentencer may not "refuse to consider ... any
relevant mitigating evidence" or "disregard the mitigating evidence [the defendant] proffer[s] on
his behalf'; "The sentencer ... may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating
evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their
consideration.").
Thus, any juror whose views created a substantial impairment to his or her consideration
of factors that could result in a life sentence or, having appropriately found the facts, created a
substantial impairment in his or her ability to consider a life verdict should be excused for cause.
2. Facts in Support of the Argument
Before starting the resentencing trial, defense counsel and State's counsel each proposed
a selection process. #32773, R. Vol. 3, pp. 504-07, 522-24, #32773, R. Vol. 4, pp. 570-74. The
resentencing court selected the State's proposal: a questionnaire completed by each venire
member; general voir dire with the entire venire panel; and individual voir dire. #32773, R. Vol.
4, pp. 602-603. Each potential juror completed a 27-page written questionnaire. Selected
questions focused upon the individual venire member's views on the death penalty. See e.g., R.
2163-2168. The resentencing court then conducted a general voir dire session with all the venire
members. R. 1605-1706. Finally, counsel for the parties conducted a five-minute individual,
sequestered voir dire. R. 1734-1813.
The State proposed the individual voir dire as the opportunity for "the parties [to focus
on] ... the death penalty and the exposure to pretrial publicity." #32773, R. Vol. 3, pp. 504-05.
Questions concerning the fair assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors were anticipated.
Id. at 505. The State also sought individual voir dire as a necessary procedure to ensure honest
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and candid answers to views on the death penalty. #32773, R. Vol. 4, pp. 572. Both parties
understood, in theory, that the individual voir dire, limited by the resentencing court to five
minutes, was a focused effort to determine the prospective juror's position on automatic life
imposition and automatic death imposition. In other words, individual voir dire was to
determine which jurors were excludable under Witherspoon and Morgan.

3. Grounds for Relief
The record in this case establishes independent Witherspoon and Morgan violations, as
well as trial counsel's ineffective assistance for failing to adequately question potential jurors
and challenge the exclusion of one potential juror and the inclusion of eleven potential jurors
under those same standards. It was ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to omit these
claims from the appellant's brief.
The Witherspoon and Morgan violations are clearly stronger than the second issue raised
by appellate counsel in Appellant's Opening Brief. R. 956-58. That appellate claim was based
upon the resentencing court's refusal to exclude two biased jurors for cause. Id. These jurors
were removed with peremptory strikes and did not sit on the jury. #32773, Tr. Vol. 4 at 187-88.
The biased jury and due process issue raised by appellate counsel was foreclosed under Ross v.
Oklahoma. 487 U.S. at 83-84, 85-86. "[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory
challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury." Ross, 487 U.S.
at 88. "So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a
peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated."
Id.
Claim selection and winnowing claims in the interest of a more targeted appellate brief
and advocacy, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983), neither justifies nor excuses the
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abandonment of clearly stronger, winning claims. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288; Gray
v. Greer, 800 F.2d at 646. Here, appellate counsel failed to include clearly stronger claims and

in doing so was ineffective. Appellate counsel should have omitted Issue II from its brief, R.
956-58, in favor of the clearly stronger, winning issues set forth below.

a. Potential Juror McMinton was Improperly Excluded Under Witherspoon
The resentencing court's exclusion of potential juror McMinton based upon Witherspoon,
R. 1812-13, was an incorrect application of the law. Appellate counsel should have raised this
claim. The PCR court erred in dismissing this claim as a matter of law. Reasonable inferences
drawn in petitioner's favor establish that a constitutional violation resulted in the improper
dismissal of a juror.
Constitutionally adequate selection of a capital jury balances the state's right to include
jurors open to imposing death with the defendant's right to include jurors open to choosing life
and giving effect to mitigating evidence. The error claimed here is the improper exclusion of a
potential juror based upon her general opposition to the imposition of the death penalty.

Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520-21, Adams, 448 U.S. at 48, Witt, 469 U.S. at 423.
This challenge is limited and applies only to those potential jurors who, in advance of
trial, would not even consider returning a verdict of death. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520. "A
man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary
judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror." Id. at
519. A jury "[ c]ulled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment - of all
who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty - such a jury can speak only for a
distinct and dwindling minority." Id. at 520. In Adams, 448 U.S. 38, the Supreme Court
described the standard for Witherspoon exclusions: "unless those views [on capital punishment]
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would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with
his instructions and his oath" the juror may not be challenged for cause. Id. at 45.
The burden is on the proponent of the exclusion to establish a juror lacks impartiality.
Witt, 469 U.S. at 423. Here, the State moved to exclude McMinton based upon Witherspoon. R.

1812-13. McMinton's views on the death penalty, as documented by her questionnaire and
answers in voir dire, did not establish she was substantially impaired and unable to perform the
duties as instructed.
Venire member McMinton completed her questionnaire, including the questions designed
to identify her views on the implementation of the death penalty. In relevant part, McMinton's
questionnaire answers confirm she favored the death penalty and would consider imposing the
death penalty as guided by the law and her oath as a juror. Counsel received the juror
questionnaires in advance of the group and individual voir dire and specifically questioned
McMinton about her questionnaire response, indicating her feelings about the death penalty.
See, R. 1809.

In her juror questionnaire, R. 2149-76, McMinton provided the following answers:
•

Ms. McMinton disagreed that "murder is murder, and understanding motives and

circumstances is not important." R. 2163, sub-part d.
•

She disagreed that "only the worst murderers should be executed." Id., sub-partj.

•

She agreed that "it doesn't matter what kind of childhood a murderer had.", R.

2164, sub-part dd, and that "people who kill should be punished no matter what the
circumstances are." R. 2165, sub-part aaa.
•

She disagreed that "life in prison without the possibility of parole is not a harsh

enough penalty for murder." R. 2164, sub-part bb.
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•

She agreed that she was "uncomfortable about having to decide about executing

someone", that she "would review all the evidence before [she] made a decision in this case" and
that she "would listen to all the evidence before [she] made a decision in this case." R. 2165-66,
sub-parts kk:k, ooo, ppp.
•

She agreed that she "could vote for the death penalty in some cases if [she] were

on a jury." R. 2164, sub-part cc.
McMinton's attitude about the death penalty was articulated through additional responses
to the questionnaire. In the narrative, she wrote: "When they are guilty of taking a life then they
should be willing to give a life." When asked if she "supports or opposes the death penalty", she
stated that she supports it. She did not feel that her views on the death penalty would prevent or
substantially impair her ability to view the facts impartially or to impose the death penalty. R.
2166.
The questionnaire included an explanation of the sentencing process. "The Jury will
decide what sentence the Defendant shall receive. The Judge will instruct the Jury on the law
applicable to this case and it is the Jury's duty to follow the law as given by the Judge. Will you

follow the instructions upon the law given by the Judge even

ifyou thought the law was different

or disagree with the law as instructed by the Judge?" McMinton answered "yes" to this
question. R. 2163 (emphasis added). In the concluding answer to this part of the questionnaire,
McMinton answered: "I generally favor the death penalty, but I would base a decision to impose
it on the facts and the law in the case." R. 2168.
The answers and information provided in the questionnaire were under penalty of
perjury. R. 2176, 2150. Unlike a typical Witherspoon juror, McMinton expressed general
support for the death penalty and no reservations based upon general objections or religious
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scruples. McMinton clearly established she could follow the law and abide by her oath as a juror
through her questionnaire answers. Adams, 448 U.S. at 48.
Defense counsel began the individual voir dire for McMinton with questions about her
position on the death penalty, that someone guilty of taking a life "should be willing to give a
life." She agreed that her position was an "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth" proposition.
R.1809, 1. 14-22. On her own initiative, McMinton asked for clarification regarding whether
Dunlap had mental problems. Id., I. 23. After counsel responded that was "something ... we are
going to talk about", id. I. 24-25, she stated, "Well, on that fact I don't think I could give you a
verdict of death. There is just no way. I know about mental illness and there is just no way." R.
1810, 1. 1-3. Her first answer on the impact of mental illness is not the complete answer. That
complete answer is developed through the prosecution's questioning.
The State's counsel asked if McMinton "would be willing to follow the law" even if she
disagreed with it. R. 1811, 1. 13-16. She agreed to do so, affirming her questionnaire answer.

Id., 1. 17. Unwilling to accept this unequivocal answer, the deputy attorney general asked a
series of questions designed to commit McMinton to a result should certain evidence be
introduced. The State then "staked-out" the juror with an improper question that assumed mental
health evidence could not outweigh the aggravating evidence and used that as the basis for
excluding her.
The deputy attorney general inquired:
Q.
If the facts and evidence in this case indicated that the death
penalty was appropriate, and that [sic] being that the aggravating factors of this
crime were not outweighed by any mitigation, would you refuse to give the death
penalty just based on evidence that he might have had some mental problems?
A.
That is a hard one to answer. I am not sure.
Q.
I guess my question is, would you give more weight to the fact that
there may be mental illness than you would the other evidence?
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A.

On my past experience with my stepsister, I would have to say

yeah.
Q.
So if there is evidence of any sort of mental problems, you could
not give the death penalty?
A.
I could not.
R. 1811-12, 1. 22-10 (emphasis added).
Based upon McMinton's answers to the questionnaire and individual voir dire, the State
was not entitled to exclude McMinton for cause under Witherspoon. On at least two occasions,
McMinton affirmed under penalty of perjury that she could follow the law with regard to
sentencing determinations and she clearly stated her willingness to give death in some
circumstances.
The State's true objection was that McMinton would give weight to a mitigating factor
that it believed was present in the case. Under Idaho's sentencing scheme, the jury is entitled to
find mitigating evidence. LC. §19-2515. Eachjuror is entitled to give as much weight to the
mitigating evidence as is warranted. Each juror can determine whether the mitigating evidence
outweighs the aggravating evidence so that imposition of the death penalty is unwarranted. LC.
§ 19-2515 (7)(b).
The State's basis for cause was that "if [mental illness] evidence was presented, she
couldn't give the death penalty. So for that we are challenging her for cause." R. 1812, 1. 13-15.
The court agreed," ... if there is any mental problem she couldn't give the death sentence, I think
that disqualifies her as a juror. I don't think that would be the law." Id. at 1. 20-22. 5 The law is,
however, clear and clearly in favor of Dunlap.

Dunlap was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by the exclusion of Juror
McMinton and the Court's refusal to allow any follow-up questions. R. 1813. He was also
denied the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment by trial counsel's failure
to request the opportunity to rehabilitate McMinton or to object to the State's motion to excuse
her for cause. See infra at 43.
5
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A juror does not express the "general objections to the death penalty" by indicating some
type of mitigating evidence carries weight, great weight or even the ultimate weight in her
decision-making. This is not the same as being "irrevocably committed ... to vote against the
penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the
proceedings." Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 657-58 (1987) (internal citations omitted)
(citing Witherspoon). McMinton's expressed view was an indication that she would follow the
law in giving meaningful consideration to mitigation, as is required of any juror sitting on a
capital case. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007) ("sentencing juries must
be able to give meaningful consideration and effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide
a basis for refusing to impose the death penalty on a particular individual, notwithstanding the
severity of his crime or his potential to commit similar offenses in the future"); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) ("the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in
all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.") (footnotes omitted, emphasis in
original).
The PCR court rejected Dunlap's appellate IAC claim for not raising the Witherspoon
issue based on McMinton's "unwillingness to impose the death penalty if mental health issues
were established." R. 2292. The court acknowledged that McMinton was generally "supportive
of the death penalty"; however, "when presented with the concept of an accompanying mental
health issue," the court stated that she became "rigid and inflexible." R. 2293.
McMinton was by no means an automatic vote for life and excludable under
Witherspoon. Though generally inclined to give death for murder, she was willing to give
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substantial mitigating weight to evidence of mental health issues and reconsider her general
support of death to give life if mental health evidence was presented. If jurors who would vote
to impose death 90% of the time are not automatically in favor of death in all instances and
therefore not substantially impaired in favor of death and against the consideration of mitigating
evidence, e.g., United States v. Fulks, 454 F.3d 410,428 (4th Cir. 2006), then McMinton, who
generally favored death, was not automatically in favor of life in all instances and was not
substantially impaired in her ability to consider death simply because she would give great
mitigating weight to mental health evidence.
In fact, the ability to give effect to mitigating mental health evidence is not only
desirable, but required.
Evidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant
because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit
criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to
emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who
have no such excuse ... (emphasis added)
In light of this principle it is clear that a State may not
constitutionally prevent the sentencing body from giving effect to evidence
relevant to the defendant's background or character or the circumstances of
the offense that mitigates against the death penalty. Indeed, the right to
have the sentencer consider and weigh relevant mitigating evidence would
be meaningless unless the sentencer was also permitted to give effect to its
consideration. (emphasis original)

Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 251-52 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184-85 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring), quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,545 ((1987) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In removing potential juror McMinton for
cause because she gave powerful weight to mitigating mental health evidence, even though she
generally favored the death penalty, the resentencing court erred and violated Witherspoon.
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The court in Fulks determined that the generally pro-death juror was not substantially
impaired in favor of death, even though he gave mitigating evidence less weight, because he
could consider giving life in some instances. Similarly, generally pro-death juror McMinton was
not substantially impaired in favor oflife just because she personally gave mitigating evidence of
mental health issues more weight. Her willingness to give a life sentence based on a different
evaluation of the relative weight of the mitigating evidence is not a basis for removing her from
the jury. "[A]lthough a juror must be willing and able to consider mitigating evidence," she "is
entitled 'to determine the weight to be given' to any such evidence." Fulks, 454 F.3d at 428
(quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115). McMinton did not meet the standards to be excluded under
Witherspoon.
The resentencing court relied upon answers to improper stake-out questions and ignored
McMinton's willingness both to give death in some instances and to consider, weigh and give
effect to the mitigating evidence to reach her sentencing decision. It was error to excuse her for
cause as a Witherspoon-excludable juror. The PCR court, relying upon the resentencing court's
flawed reasoning, similarly erred in rejecting the appellate IAC claim.
Appellate counsel raised an issue that was foreclosed by Ross v. Oklahoma, while
omitting this clearly stronger issue. See supra at 14-15. Cf R. 956-58 (weaker issue raised in
prior appeal). The PCR court further erred in suggesting that Dunlap failed to show the
Witherspoon issue was clearly stronger than an issue raised by appellate counsel. See R. 2294.
Dunlap expressly argued below that the issues raised in his petition in that case were "clearly
stronger claims" than the issue raised by appellate counsel regarding two jurors struck with
peremptory challenges rather than for cause. Dunlap specifically argued that the issue raised by
appellate counsel was foreclosed by Ross and had "no merit." See R. 2237-38.
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If appellate counsel had raised the claim that McMinton's exclusion violated

Witherspoon, the result of the appeal would have been different. In failing to raise this clearly
stronger, meritorious jury selection claim, appellate counsel was ineffective, having raised
instead the clearly weaker claim that was foreclosed under Ross. An incorrect exclusion of a
juror based upon Witherspoon is fundamental constitutional error and results in reversal of the
sentence. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23. The wrongful exclusion of even one juror for cause,
based on an improper death qualifying exclusion under Witherspoon, is per se reversible error.
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976). Witherspoon error is never harmless error, Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 U.S. at 660, and Dunlap's sentence must be reversed.

b. Numerous Substantially Impaired Jurors Served in Violation of Morgan
While the State is entitled to a jury comprised of individuals willing to consider the death
penalty, it is not entitled to one containing a juror who will automatically vote for death in every
case. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. Failing to remove this type of juror for cause results in
constitutional error and the sentence must be overturned. Id. at 728-29 (citing Ross, 487 U.S. at
85). Like Witherspoon error, the inclusion of a Morgan-impaired juror is structural error
mandating reversal.
Sentencing jurors cannot refuse to consider and give effect to an entire class of mitigating
evidence. "The sentencer ... may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence.
But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration."
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15 (emphasis added). Deeming mitigating evidence irrelevant, by
stating that it "doesn't matter," violates this basic tenet by effectively excluding the evidence
from the juror's consideration, even if they invoke the mantra at voir dire that they will consider
and weigh the evidence.
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In Morgan, the potential juror answered questions aimed at general fairness and
"follow[ing] the law." Morgan, 504 U.S. at 723-24, 734. These general statements were
insufficient, standing alone, to establish the potential juror was impartial. Id. at 734-35. "As to
general questions of fairness and impartiality, [impaired] jurors could in all truth and candor
respond affirmatively, personally confident that such dogmatic views are fair and impartial,
while leaving the specific concerns unprobed." Id. at 735. For example, when a juror states that
mitigating evidence of a difficult childhood "doesn't matter," such a juror effectively removes
such evidence from consideration, even if the juror dogmatically asserts that he or she can be fair
and will consider and weigh "all" of the evidence.
In Dunlap's resentencing, the details of the questionnaires along with the individual voir
dire establish Morgan-impaired jurors were seated on the jury that imposed death. Jurors who

sat on Dunlap's jury were substantially impaired because they were either automatic death
penalty ("ADP") jurors or were unable to give effect to mitigating evidence. This constitutional
violation requires reversal of the sentence and had this claim been raised in appellate briefing,
the result would have been different.
i.

Dunlap's Jury Contained Morgan-Impaired Automatic Death
Penalty Jurors

The empaneled jury contained many jurors who were ADP jurors, in violation of
Dunlap's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights. Examination of the questionnaires and individual voir dire for seated jurors
reveals not just a bias in favor of the death penalty, but that many were ADP jurors. Subsequent
statements by jurors that they would follow the law and the resentencing court's instructions did
not establish that Dunlap had a fair and impartial jury. Automatic life or death-voting jurors "by
definition are ones who cannot perform their duties in accordance with law, their protestations to
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the contrary notwithstanding." Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735. This Court has previously found the
five-minute individual voir dire was sufficient, not an abuse of discretion and precluded the need
for additional voir dire to support any Morgan challenges. Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 19-20. The
record evidence presented in support of these claims should also be deemed sufficient. Based on
the answers in the record, numerous jurors were substantially impaired under Morgan and should
not have been permitted to serve. Their presence on the jury violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this issue, omitting it in favor of the
clearly weaker issue referenced earlier in this claim. See supra at 14-15. The PCR court erred in
finding otherwise for the reasons set forth below.
Cathy Canaday was an ADP juror who should have been excused for cause. In response
to how she would feel about the defense putting on mitigating evidence, Canaday said only "it
won't be the easiest case." R. 1794-95. She claimed she could listen to the evidence and weigh
it, id. at 138, but when asked if she was fair and could be "open-minded", she responded only
"[t]o a point." Id. Asked to clarify that response, "[t]o what point is that?", she said "[b ]eing fair
human nature-wise. I mean, I have my own set of absolutes and rules." Id. (emphasis added).
Counsel made no attempt to determine her "set of absolutes and rules," even when she concluded
her voir dire examination by stating that she "pretty much sticks with my own [views]." Id. at
140.
Canaday's own views and "set of absolutes and rules" were plainly described in her
questionnaire under penalty of perjury. Among her views were the following: She agreed that
"[m]urder is murder, and understanding motives and circumstances is not important"; she
strongly disagreed that "only the worst murderers should be executed"; and she strongly agreed

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 25

that "society would be stronger if the death penalty were imposed more often." R. 2079. Most
significantly, she agreed both that life imprisonment without parole ("L WOP") "is not a harsh
enough penalty for murder" and that "(e]xecutions are needed to protect the public." She
strongly agreed that "I support ... the death penalty." R. 2080. She strongly agreed that she
"could vote for the death penalty in some cases ifl were on a jury," and disagreed that it "would
be hard for me to vote to kill someone." Id. She disagreed that she had any "concerns about the
wisdom of the death penalty." R. 2081. Canaday agreed that "[n]ot executing murderers is
disrespectful to victims," id., and that "[s]omeone already convicted of a murder is likely to kill
someone else." Id. She agreed that "[p]eople who kill should be punished no matter what the
circumstances are." Id. Canaday was already set on the existence of an aggravating
circumstance, believing that someone who has already been convicted of a murder is likely to
kill someone else. Id.
In response to, "How do you feel about the death penalty?", she wrote, "I believe in the
death penalty. I believe if the crime warrants it, it should be administered. We need some
deter[r]ent to murder and crime" R. 2082. Based on her voir dire and questionnaire responses,
Canaday was not qualified to sit on Dunlap's jury and should have been excluded for cause.
Canaday's self-description of being fair "to a point" as defined by her "own set of
absolutes and rules" defines her as a Morgan excludable juror. She demonstrated the dogmatic
view of fairness and impartiality that the United States Supreme Court warned against taking at
face value. She rejected each of the subsequent clarifications that "saved" the ADP juror in one
of the cases relied upon by the PCR court for explication of the Morgan ADP standard, Treesh v.
Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 438-39 (6th Cir. 2010) (juror would consider motives and circumstances

of murder, whether defendant had developmental difficulties as a child or was mentally
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retarded). See R. 2297. Canaday's beliefs as set forth in her questionnaire revealed an
unwillingness to understand the motives and circumstances of a murder and stated that a
defendant's childhood "didn't matter," both of which exclude consideration of mitigating
evidence. She believed life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was insufficient
punishment for murder and would not narrow the class of murderers subject to the death penalty
to only the worst murderers. Her answers established she would automatically impose death and
should have been excluded.
The PCR court erred in stating that the questioning at voir dire showed that "Canaday
had not made up her mind on whether to give Dunlap the death penalty." R. 2307. The court
relied on Canaday's willingness to give Dunlap "due benefit by listening to the evidence"
presented at trial, R. 2306, as the only basis for stating that Canaday had not made up her mind
and was not an ADP juror. A willingness to sit in the jury box and listen to the evidence does
not mean that the juror has not made up her mind already. One can listen to evidence that
"doesn't matter," e.g., evidence of Dunlap's childhood, R. 2080, but that doesn't mean
Canaday's mind wasn't already made up. Canaday had already stated that she was only "fair to
a point," that she had her own absolutes and rules, and that she sticks to her own views.
Canaday's views are well stated in her questionnaire: LWOP is not a harsh enough punishment
for murder.
Canaday is an ADP juror and the PCR court erred in finding otherwise. The resentencing
court erred in allowing Canaday to sit on the jury, and appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise this Morgan claim on direct appeal.
While Canaday is the most obviously ADP juror who sat on Dunlap's jury, other jurors
were also substantially impaired under Morgan.
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Juror Craig Crandall's questionnaire responses appear to show a bias toward imposing
the death penalty in all circumstances. Counsel did ask Crandall about his questionnaire answer
regarding how he felt about the death penalty, which stated that "if a person commits a crime
punishable by the death penalty ... so be it." When asked what "so be it" meant, Crandall
responded, "You know, I would just think that if the crime fits the punishment then that is how it
ought to be." R. 1762. The PCR court suggested that Crandall's "so be it" statement means he
will follow the law. R. 2303. The PCR court's interpretation is unreasonable in light of all of
Crandall's responses at voir dire and in the questionnaire. In response to the question "how do
you feel about the death penalty," the statement, "if a person commits a crime punishable by
death, so be it," more reasonably means the person should get the death penalty.
Although Crandall agreed that LWOP is always a reasonable option for a jury, R. 1764,
he agreed with the questionnaire statement that L WOP "is not a harsh enough penalty for
murder." R. 1940. Further, Crandall disagreed with the statement that "only the worst
murderers should get death." R. 1939. Crandall strongly disagreed with the statement, "I have
concerns about the wisdom of the death penalty." R. 1941. He disagreed that he is
"uncomfortable about having to decide about executing someone." Id. He disagreed that
"(e ]very defendant is innocent and remains so unless the State can prove otherwise." R. 1939.
He agreed that "people who kill women should be given harsher treatment." R. 1940. Given all
of these feelings in a case with a woman victim, particularly his expressed feeling that LWOP
was not harsh enough, Crandall also was an ADP juror.
The PCR court found otherwise based on Crandall's agreement with a leading question
from counsel that LWOP is always a reasonable option for the jury. R. 2303-04. Juxtaposed
against Crandall's personal belief that LWOP "is not a harsh enough penalty for murder," R.
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1940, his acknowledgment that a hypothetical jury reasonably could choose LWOP does not
change the fact that Crandall never would. Crandall's statement that he would base a decision on
whether to impose death on the facts and the law, R. 2303, without more does not establish he is
not ADP. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 734-35. Crandall never suggested there was any murder which in
his opinion would not warrant death. He would not narrow the class of murderers subject to
execution to only the worst murderers. To the contrary, his answers established that he would
automatically give death in Dunlap's case.
Much like Crandall, juror Lonnie Taggart believed that LWOP was not a harsh enough
punishment for murder, R. 2136, and disagreed that only the worst murderers should get death.
R. 2135. As many Margan-impaired jurors will say, he believed he could follow the law and do
the weighing process and be a fair and impartial juror. R. 1805. While he did say that he had not
made up his mind yet as to whether Dunlap should get the death penalty, R. 1807, and that there
might be a situation that would be unjust to give the death penalty, id., he gave no indication of
what sort of situation that might be. The PCR court erred in relying on those statements in
concluding that Taggart was not ADP. See R. 2303-04. Given Taggart's written responses that
LWOP was not a harsh enough penalty for murder, and that he would not narrow the death
penalty to the worst murderers, he was Margan-impaired.
Jurors Corey Kunz and Mat Gronning stated they could make a choice other than the
death penalty in instances that were not death eligible crimes. They each suffered from the same
basic impairment and the PCR court below ruled erroneously as to each.
During voir dire, Kunz stated that he "hadn't given ... a lot of thought" to what kind of
mitigating factors would make the death penalty unjust, but "someone talked about intent." R.
1780. There was no follow-up to this response, which appears to be a statement that death would
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be unjust when the defendant lacked intent. Often, a defendant's lack of "intent" includes
circumstances where that lack of intent is either a complete defense to first degree murder, or at
least precludes death as a sentence for the crime. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982).
Moreover, Kunz agreed both that "(p ]eople who kill should be punished no matter what
the circumstances are," and that "[s]omeone already convicted of a murder is likely to kill
someone else." R. 2025. He disagreed with the concept that "only the worst murderers should
be executed." R. 2023. He agreed that "society would be stronger if the death penalty were
imposed more often," id., that executions "are needed to protect the public," and that the "law
goes too far in protecting the rights of criminals." R. 2024. Kunz strongly agreed that he
"supports the use of the death penalty," id., and strongly disagreed that he had any "concerns
about wisdom of the death penalty." R. 2025. Kunz clearly was predisposed on the propensity
aggravating circumstance and was an ADP juror.
The PCR court found that Kunz was not an ADP juror because he supported the death
penalty and acknowledged there were "circumstances under which the death penalty could be an
appropriate penalty." R. 2300. According to the court, "This shows that Juror Kunz did not
think the death penalty was appropriate in all circumstances." Id. Nothing in Kunz's statement
indicates what circumstances those might be. His voir dire response appears to suggest that his
version of mitigating circumstances are a lack of intent, a complete defense to the crime. R.
1780. In that light, contrary to the PCR court's findings, Kunz's willingness to weigh the facts,
look at the evidence and come to his own decision, does not establish that he can give effect to
mitigation and is not an ADP juror.
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Like Kunz, Mat Gronning was willing to consider a sentence other than death for noncapital, lesser degrees of homicide. During his voir dire examination, Gronning provided the
following answers:

Q.
We are trying to determine your opinion on the death penalty. One
of the questions is how do you feel about the death penalty? You wrote, "In some
cases it is fair and warranted." You generally support the death penalty. What
does that mean?
A.
Well, basically I think you take it case by case. In my opinion, you
know, if someone has thought it out, planned it, and then they execute it the way
they had it planned, I think it is different than something of a spur-of-the-moment
type thing. That is kind of what I mean by that.
R. 1748, 1. 11-20. Gronning's answer is another case of a juror believing that the
circumstances where death is not appropriate are limited to instances of a lesser degree of
murder, a non-deliberate, non-premeditated murder that would not even be eligible for
the death penalty.
The PCR court found Gronning was "obviously" not ADP because he said in
some cases the death penalty was "fair and warranted" and he acknowledged cases where
it would not be appropriate. R. 2301. However, the voir dire question did not specify the
kind of cases where the death penalty would not be appropriate. R. 1749. As previously
shown, Gronning differentiated between degrees of murder, contrasting the premeditated
"planned out" first degree murder from the un-planned, "spur of the moment" murder.
Finding Gronning was not ADP based on that response was error.
Gronning disagreed with the concept that "only the worst murderers should be executed."
R. 1883. He agreed that "society would be stronger if the death penalty were imposed more
often," id., and that executions "are needed to protect the public." R. 1884. Gronning disagreed
that "it would be hard for me to vote to kill someone," id., or that he would be "uncomfortable
about having to decide about executing someone." R. 1885.
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In light of these responses, Gronning's willingness to listen to the evidence and decide
whether Dunlap should get the death penalty does not equate to him being qualified as an
impartial juror. Having indicated that the mitigating evidence that would matter to him was
evidence of a defense to the crime, Gronning was substantially impaired under Morgan. In
finding otherwise, the PCR court erred.
ii.

Dunlap's Jury Contained Morgan-Impaired Jurors Unable to
Give Effect to Mitigating Evidence

A number of other jurors who sat on Dunlap's jury were substantially impaired under
Morgan because they could not give effect to mitigating evidence. Examination of the
questionnaires and individual voir dire for seated jurors reveals the admission by many jurors
that could not consider and give weight to mitigating evidence relating to Dunlap's childhood.
As previously shown, supra at 11-13, 20-22, the inability to give effect to mitigating evidence,
by treating it as irrelevant evidence that "didn't matter," renders a juror substantially impaired
under Morgan, Lockett, Eddings and Abdul-Kabir. Many of Dunlap's jurors were so impaired.
Question 26 (dd) on the juror questionnaire sought the juror's agreement or disagreement
with the statement: "It doesn't matter what kind of childhood a murderer had." See generally
page 15 of each juror's questionnaire, R. 1814-2148. Numerous jurors agreed under penalty of
perjury that the kind of childhood a murderer had "doesn't matter." Those jurors were
substantially impaired in their ability to give effect to mitigating evidence.
Juror Canaday agreed that it "doesn't matter what kind of childhood a murderer had," R.
2080, and therefore could not give effect to mitigating evidence of a defendant's childhood. So
did Mat Gronning. R. 1884. Thus, Gronning, too, indicated that he could not give effect to
mitigating evidence and, was substantially impaired.
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Juror Michael Nally strongly agreed that "It doesn't matter what kind of childhood a
murderer had." R. 2052. Nally was a strongly pro-death penalty juror, like Canaday and
Gronning, who could not give effect to this type of mitigating evidence. Nally Questionnaire, R.
2051-56. He strongly agreed that "[m]urder is murder, and understanding motives and
circumstances is not important"; and he disagreed that "only the worst murderers should be
executed." R. 2051. Nally agreed that the "law goes too far in protecting the rights of
criminals." R. 2052. Nally strongly agreed that "[p]eople who kill should be punished no matter
what the circumstances are," and agreed that"[ s]omeone already convicted of a murder is likely
to kill someone else." R. 2053. The PCR court's reliance on statements by Nally that he was
"fairly objective" and could give both sides a "fair shake," R. 2304, overlooks the primary point
in Morgan, that jurors may honestly believe they are impartial even though they are substantially
impaired in favor of death. Likewise, Nally's willingness to engage in the "weighing process,"
relied upon by the PCR court to show he was not ADP, R. 2304, is no different than the juror's
willingness to "follow the law" in Morgan, another talismanic invocation that fails to establish a
juror is impartial under Morgan.
Juror Hagen Beckstead likewise believed that it "doesn't matter what kind of childhood a
murderer had." R. 2108. While Beckstead explained that he could be fair and consider giving
both life and death, R. 1798-99, he was unaware that his view rejecting any mitigating effect of a
murderer's childhood made him substantially impaired under Morgan. It is for this reason that
the PCR court's finding that he was not ADP, R. 2305, is erroneous. Like so many others of
Dunlap's jurors, Beckstead could honestly say he would consider and weigh the evidence
without realizing that he was substantially impaired based on his belief that Dunlap's childhood
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"didn't matter." See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735-36 (jurors substantially impaired if mitigating
evidence is "irrelevant").
Three other jurors responded that a murderer's childhood was not important, an answer
that indicates their inability to consider and give effect to certain mitigating evidence. See
Questionnaires of Chandis Lindsay, Kristine Robinson and Eric Christensen, R. 1829, 1912,
1996. All of these jurors indicated strong support for the death penalty. R. 1828-30, 1911-13,
1995-96. To the extent their questionnaire responses show that they considered evidence of
Dunlap's difficult childhood irrelevant, like Beckstead, these jurors were substantially impaired
under Morgan.
The PCR court found that Lindsay and Robinson were not substantially impaired because
they stated they could "weigh" the mitigating evidence. R. 2299, 2302. The PCR court
erroneously stated that Dunlap made no assertion of bias against Christensen, other than his
general support of the death penalty, R. 2305, when in fact the PCR court had previously noted
that Dunlap had challenged Christensen on the ground that he "found no distinction between the
class of murders eligible for execution, disagreed that upbringing could be mitigating and that
childhood experiences did not matter in mitigation." R. 2299 n. 20 (quoting Dunlap's
Supplemental Response Brief at 1712, see R. 2231 ). See also R. 1418, 1419 (identifying
Lindsay, Robinson and Christensen as substantially impaired based on inability to consider
mitigating effect of murderer's childhood, and seven jurors overall who had the same
impairment).
Seven jurors indicated their substantial impairment as jurors in their questionnaire
responses that Dunlap's childhood "didn't matter" to them. The irrelevance of this mitigating
evidence to these jurors likewise precluded their service as jurors, notwithstanding their response
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that they would listen to the evidence, weigh it, and follow the law. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at
729, 739.
Five jurors were pre-disposed on the existence of the aggravating factor of propensity to
commit murder. Kim Lindstrom and Kristine Robinson indicated their predisposition on the
propensity aggravating circumstance with their agreement on their questionnaires that
"[s]omeone already convicted of a murder is likely to kill someone else." R. 1858, 1913.
Further, the PCR court noted that Lindstrom never stated directly whether she would give death
automatically to those guilty of murder, but responded instead that it was a moral and legal
question. Finding this sufficient under Morgan was error. Simply stating a willingness to follow
the law is insufficient to preclude an ADP finding, and recognizing that there is a moral question
likewise does not preclude one from being ADP. Indeed, many jurors are ADP because they
believe the moral question asked with respect to the death penalty is answered by "eye for an
eye" philosophy. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 536 (Black, J. dissenting). In addition to Lindstrom
and Robinson, jurors Canaday, Nally and Kunz shared the belief that someone convicted of
murder is likely to kill someone else. R. 2081, 2053, 2025. Given their strong support for the
death penalty, these answers further establish they were substantially impaired.
Morgan impairment is sometimes called "reverse Witherspoon" impairment. Morganimpaired jurors who cannot give effect to mitigating evidence are substantially impaired in their
ability to consider a sentence other than death. Witherspoon jurors are substantially impaired in
their ability to consider a sentence other than life. If a juror is impaired under Witherspoon,
based on a finding that a juror gives dispositive weight to a particular type of mitigating evidence
in favor of life, then the converse applies in the reverse-Witherspoon context: a juror who
disregards a particular type of mitigating evidence and is unable to give it any mitigating effect
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on the ground that "it doesn't matter," is substantially impaired in favor of death. See Eddings,
455 U.S. at 114-15 (the sentencer may not "refuse to consider ... any relevant mitigating
evidence" or "disregard the mitigating evidence [the defendant] proffer[s] on his behalf'; "The
sentencer ... may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may
not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration."). If potential juror
McMinton was substantially impaired because she gave strongly mitigating effect to a particular
type of mitigating evidence - i.e., mental illness - then jurors who could not give any mitigating
effect to a particular type of mitigating evidence - Dunlap's difficult childhood - are no less
substantially impaired. If the exclusion of McMinton was correct, then these jurors were
likewise impaired and should have been dismissed for cause.
For all of the reasons set forth in this section, Dunlap was denied an impartial jury in
violation of Morgan, the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The seating of even one Morgan-impaired juror is grounds for reversal. Ross v.

Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 85; Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. Appellate counsel was ineffective in not
raising these issues on appeal.

c. Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance in the Voir Dire Examinations,
Exercise of Challenges for Cause and Opposition to Unsupported Excusal for
Cause
The PCR court erred in its treatment of Dunlap's appellate IAC claim for failing to raise
an IAC voir dire trial claim. The court held that the introductory paragraph, R. 1573 130, is
wholly conclusory and appeared to treat it as an individual claim. R. 2288. The court asserted
that there "are no admissible facts in the record to support Dunlap's claim that trial counsel's
general performance during voir dire fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as
required by Strickland." Id. However, the court acknowledged that Dunlap made specific
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allegations of trial IAC relating to the conduct of voir dire and jury selection that should have
been raised on appeal. Id. Nevertheless, the court found there is "no basis to find" that trial
counsel's general performance on voir dire "fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness,"
based merely on the introductory paragraph of the claim, 130. R. 2289.
The PCR court did address aspects of trial counsel's inadequate voir dire regarding Juror
McMinton and the jurors who sat on the jury, but Dunlap notes that paragraph 30 and the
conduct of the voir dire by trial counsel is all part of one trial IAC claim that appellate counsel
failed to raise. Paragraphs 31, 32 and 33 all raise allegations of trial ineffectiveness, which must
be read together with 130. With that clarification, it is obvious that Dunlap cited numerous facts
and specific allegations of admissible evidence in 1130-33 of the Amended Petition. These
allegations, all apparent from the record, including the voir dire and questionnaires submitted
under penalty of perjury, include counsel's failure to follow up on obvious red flags in
statements made by the prospective jurors in voir dire and in their questionnaires, failure to move
to exclude many jurors for cause, and failure to rehabilitate juror McMinton and oppose the
State's motion to exclude her for cause.
The PCR court ascribed a tactical decision to both trial counsel's conduct of voir dire and
appellate counsel's failure to raise the trial IAC voir dire claim on appeal. With respect to the
entire claim as a whole, 1130-33, regardless of the court's treatment of130 by itself, Dunlap was
denied effective counsel at voir dire and on appeal.
The PCR court's decision that appellate counsel strategically chose to pursue other claims
with more "viable" issues, R. 2294, 2309, is clearly wrong, as appellate counsel raised one claim
that was frivolous and contrary to Ross v. Oklahoma. See supra at 14-15. As to the proof of
prejudice from trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the seating of biased jurors in violation of Morgan
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or the wrongful removal of a juror under Witherspoon is structural error mandating reversal and
prejudice is presumed. See supra at 23-24, 36-37.
While the resentencing court's unreasonable temporal limitation is certainly responsible
in part for the truncated individual questioning, those limits cannot excuse trial counsel's failure
to explore issues presented in the jury questionnaire responses of jurors who ultimately were
seated on Dunlap's jury. Trial counsel spent valuable limited time on completely irrelevant
matters, such as the Super Bowl, a juror's ranch and amount of snow there, and the Simpsons
and other t.v. shows. R. 1736, 1747-50, 1762. Counsel wasted some of the limited voir dire
time on questions the prosecutor had already asked. Id. at 1792-93, 1796.
Nor can the time limits excuse trial counsel's failure to move to strike for cause those
prospective jurors who stated on their questionnaires that they would not meaningfully consider
certain mitigating evidence and/or indicated that they would automatically vote for death. Many
jurors who sat and decided Dunlap's sentence indicated that their ability to meaningfully
consider a sentence less than death would be substantially impaired. See supra at 23-37.
Trial counsel was ineffective in not examining numerous jurors during the individual voir

dire about answers on their questionnaires, highlighted in the Morgan sections, supra indicating
a bias toward imposing death and an inability to consider and give effect to mitigation. The State
argued below that the failure to inquire was a strategic decision, based on the limited time. The
limited time made it no less important that questions, aimed at ferreting out bias in favor of the
death penalty and against mitigating evidence, be asked; the failure to do so was inexcusable.
This was a resentencing trial with guilt already decided. Yet counsel failed to ask critical
questions related to sentencing, while often wasting precious time on general conversation
unrelated to issues in the case. Based on the answers in the record from the questionnaires and
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limited voir dire, numerous jurors were substantially impaired under Morgan and should not
have been permitted to serve. Their presence on the jury violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The failure to ask clarifying questions of those jurors or to move to
exclude them for cause based on the existing record in their questionnaire responses violated
Dunlap's right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment as applied by
Strickland.
Despite the extensive record evidence of seated jurors who were substantially impaired as
ADP jurors and because they could not consider and give effect to certain mitigating evidence,
defense counsel failed to inquire into these areas or move to exclude the jurors for cause. ADP
jurors are obviously prejudicial to the defense. Cf Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 40-41
(Mo. 2006) ("No competent defense attorney would intentionally leave someone on the jury who
indicated a strong preference for the death penalty" and would hold the defense to a higher
standard of proof; any strategy to put such a person on the jury is "wholly unreasonable"). The
only question before the jury was whether Dunlap would receive a sentence of life without
parole or death. R. 1713-14. No reasonable strategic reason existed for failing to seek dismissal
for cause or make further inquiry of such Morgan-impaired jurors. Given a record rife with
apparently impaired jurors, trial counsel illuminated his lack of understanding of capital voir dire
and incompetence regarding Morgan dismissals when he explained that he thought the inquiry of
whether a prospective juror would automatically vote for death "would be a question for
somebody from the Attorney General's Office to ask." R. 391. This ignorance of the controlling
law cannot be turned into "strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-91. No reasonable strategy
supports trial counsel's abdication of their role in exploring and disqualifying Morgan jurors.
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With respect to a juror's claimed ability to be "open-minded and fair to a point,"
Parmenter acknowledged that such an answer was a red flag worthy of further inquiry, because it
indicated there was a point where the juror "failed to be open-minded." R. 398. Juror Canaday
gave just such an answer, yet Parmenter failed to follow-up on her obvious ADP biases, on the
points where she was not able to be fair and open-minded, and on her personal "absolutes," as
shown supra at 25-28, and finally failed to move to strike her for cause. Counsel wasted some of
the limited voir dire time on questions about Canaday's background in psychology and whether
she could "consider" psychological evidence, R. 1796, even though the prosecutor had already
asked the same basic questions. R. 1792-93. Trial counsel's voir dire of Canaday was deficient
and prejudicial.
Where jurors' questionnaire responses indicate that they would automatically vote for the
death penalty after a murder conviction, failure to voir dire adequately on the jurors' ability to
fairly assess the sentence to determine whether the jurors were qualified to serve is ineffective
assistance of counsel. Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 632-33 (Mo. 2002) (en bane). At issue in
Knese was trial counsel's failure to even read the questionnaires. Id. While the facts of Knese

are different, the underlying duty to question a juror's strongly indicated ADP beliefs triggered
by reading the questionnaire remains applicable. Although trial counsel read the questionnaire
responses in this case, he was still ineffective. Allowing substantially impaired jurors to remain
on the jury is structural error that requires the death sentence be vacated. Id. at 633. In the
ineffective assistance context under Strickland, the failure to move for cause or engage in further
voir dire regarding the problematic questionnaire responses substantially undermines confidence

in the outcome and establishes prejudice. Id.
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Trial counsel should have moved to exclude for cause all of the Morgan-impaired jurors
previously discussed. In addition to the plainly ADP jurors, see supra at 23-32, a number of
jurors clearly indicated in their questionnaire that it did not matter to them what kind of
childhood a murderer had. See supra at 23-25, 32-37. Childhood experiences, whether some
form of abuse, mental problems, isolation or neglect is mitigating evidence that a sentencer may
not refuse to consider. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-16. A juror in a death penalty case may not
refuse to consider mitigating evidence outright. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728-29. Wholesale refusal
to consider any aspect of a defendant's childhood by these jurors constituted substantial
impairment. Where the questionnaire response and completed voir dire established the
substantial impairment of the ability to consider mitigating evidence of Dunlap's childhood,
defense counsel should have moved to exclude the jurors for cause. To the extent that the
impairment was only established through the questionnaire, it was not rebutted in the voir dire
and defense counsel still should have pursued the "for cause" disqualification of the Morganimpaired jurors and clarified the impairment through further questioning.
Similar analysis applies to other impairments, such as a belief that the death penalty is not
appropriate for an un-premeditated, "spur of the moment" murder. See discussion of Gronning,
supra. Counsel did not follow-up or move to exclude for cause, even though Gronning also

volunteered that he coached the victim's brother. R. 1751. Similarly, trial counsel made no
follow-up or motion to exclude based on Juror Kunz's statement that death would be unjust
when the defendant lacked intent. See discussion of Kunz, supra.

If the voir dire alone did not establish these impairments, then the substantial impairment
evidenced in the questionnaires made under penalty of perjury, and not rebutted at voir dire by
the resentencing court, State or trial counsel, established the substantial impairment.
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Further, trial counsel failed to oppose the State's motion to strike McMinton for cause.
R. 1809-13. Trial counsel's failure to oppose the State's motion and failure to attempt to
rehabilitate this juror fell well below acceptable voir dire practice and resulted in the improper
exclusion under Witherspoon of a qualified juror. The PCR court wrongly credits this failure to
trial counsel strategy. R. 2294. James Archibald questioned McMinton for the defense at voir
dire. R. 1809. Archibald admitted he did not remember the Witherspoon case or any broad

principles from case law as to who could or could not sit on a capital jury. R. 564. Moreover,
the defense case primarily relied on Dunlap's having mental problems. For the defense to allow
the prosecution to successfully remove a juror who found mental problems mitigating, without
objection, is simply not strategic and cuts against the defense theory of the case. R. 1812.
Trial counsel repeatedly failed on numerous occasions to follow-up on areas identified in
juror questionnaires. Counsel failed to question jurors on their beliefs regarding automatic
imposition of the death penalty, their inability to give meaningful consideration to mitigating
evidence, their exposure to publicity or the prior verdict, or their relationships with witnesses or
the victim. R. 1734-1813. The PCR court's reliance on answers by jurors that they could be fair
and impartial and follow the law by weighing the evidence does not meet the requirements of
Morgan. Many of these jurors honestly believed that they could be fair and impartial, and listen

to the evidence and weigh it, but given their responses in voir dire and in questionnaires, they
were nevertheless substantially impaired in their ability to give effect to mitigating evidence.
The removal of potential juror McMinton for cause and the seating of substantially
impaired jurors in violation of Morgan resulted in a biased jury, a fundamentally unfair trial and
prejudicial, structural, fundamental error. Dunlap was denied his rights under the Due Process
Clause, Morgan, and Witherspoon and to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, as well
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as to the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland and the Sixth Amendment. Appellate
counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these claims on appeal.
C. Unconstitutional Restriction on Voir Dire In Preliminary Instruction P-3
Preliminary Instruction P-3 violates due process. Appellate counsel should have raised
this legal error on appeal. This Court reviews the legal challenge de novo. Rhoades, 148 Idaho
at 250.
Preliminary Instruction P-3, paragraph 16, violated Witherspoon, Morgan, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. The
instruction overly emphasized the need to exclude jurors who were inclined to render a life
sentence unless they could follow the law as given in the instructions. The instruction ignored
the same requirement that jurors who were inclined to render a death sentence had to follow the
law as given. This instruction, in combination with the limited time 6 for voir dire to explore
individual views on the death penalty, led to the seating of jurors who were substantially
impaired in their ability to follow the instructions. The limited time for individual voir dire,
combined with Instruction P-3's emphasis on juror impairment tethered primarily to an inability
to give the death penalty, led to the seating of jurors who were not life qualified in violation of
the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In failing to challenge Instruction P-3, appellate
counsel was ineffective.
During voir dire, Preliminary Instruction P-3, paragraph 16, was read to the venire panel.
In pertinent part, it stated:
Because your verdict could lead to imposition of the death penalty, your attitude
toward the death penalty is a proper subject of inquiry by the court and the
attorney.

6

As previously noted, this Court upheld the five minute limitation on voir dire in Dunlap V.
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The fact that you may have reservations about, or conscientious or
religious objections to, capital punishment does not automatically disqualify you
as a juror in a capital case. Ofprimary importance is whether you can
subordinate your personal philosophy to your duty to abide by your oath as a
juror and follow the law I give to you. If you are willing to render a verdict that
speaks the truth as you find it to exist, even though such verdict may lead to the
imposition of the death penalty, you are qualified to serve as a juror in this case.
If, however, you possess such strong opinions regarding capital punishment, no
matter what the opinions may be, that you would be prevented from or
substantially impaired in the performance of your duties as a juror, you are not
qualified to serve as a juror.
It is up to each of you, using the standard described to search your
conscience to determine whether you are in a position to follow the law as I give
it to you and render a verdict as the evidence warrants. Only by your candor can
either the accused or the State of Idaho be assured of having this extremely
serious case resolved by a fair and impartial juror.

R. 172 (emphasis added).
Jurors who will automatically vote for a life or a death sentence, regardless of the
evidence, are substantially impaired in their ability to follow the law and sentencing instructions,
or obey their oath as jurors. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. at 45 ("a juror may not be challenged for
cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions
and his oath"). See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 ("reverse-Witherspoon" voir dire of jurors'
inability to consider a life sentence is constitutionally required). Cf Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (removal of jurors merely because of general scruples against capital punishment
denies due process right to impartial jury; juror may be excluded for cause if would
automatically vote against the death penalty).
Preliminary Instruction P-3, paragraph 16, as read by the resentencing court, emphasized
the problems faced by jurors who had concerns about imposing the death penalty. While the
instruction addressed the notion that the nature of the juror's "strong opinion" about capital
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punishment was irrelevant, ("no matter what those opinions may be"), those words rang hollow
in light of the resentencing court's selective examples. The instruction's language was addressed
to those jurors with "reservations about, or conscientious or religious objections to, capital
punishment." R. 172. Moreover, the instruction conveyed the impression that only objections to
capital punishment were an obstacle to service on the jury; the instruction stated "[i]f you are
willing to render a verdict that speaks the truth as you find it to exist, even though such verdict
may lead to the imposition of the death penalty, you are qualified to serve as a juror in this case."
Id. This instruction misstated the law and failed to instruct jurors who automatically favored or
strongly leaned toward the death penalty that they too were substantially impaired in their ability
to serve as jurors unless they could follow the instructions and their oath. Merely being able to
"consider" the mitigating evidence is insufficient; a juror must be able to give effect to
mitigating evidence. This instruction, together with the limited and ineffective voir dire of a
panel rife with "automatic death penalty" jurors, led to the seating of a jury that was not
impartial, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The PCR court suggests that Dunlap pointed to no jurors who were impaired in their
ability to follow the law and their oath, R. 2286, when in fact, Dunlap raised the issue of
particular jurors who were substantially impaired under both Morgan and wrongly excluded
under Witherspoon. See supra at 23-37. Based on the conduct of voir dire, the limited inquiry
allowed, and the pro-death bias of the panel, this instruction added to the general focus on
excusing life-leaningjurors and minimizing the concerns regarding death leaning jurors.
Instruction P-3 failed to explain adequately that jurors could not serve on the jury if they were
automatically predisposed in favor of the death penalty. Under the circumstances of this case, in
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particular, but on its face as well, this instruction is improperly one-sided and should be
disallowed as an unconstitutional instruction under Witherspoon and Morgan.
Attacking Preliminary Instruction P-3 would have strengthened appellate counsel's claim
regarding the inadequacies of individual voir dire, and it was ineffective for appellate counsel
not to raise the issue. Like appellate counsel's failure to challenge the individual voir dire, the
failure to challenge this instruction was ineffective, particularly in light of the much weaker jury
selection issue, foreclosed by Ross, which was raised instead.

D. Vague and Ambiguous Propensity Instruction Violates the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth
Amendments
Dunlap alleged appellate counsel provided IAC because counsel did not challenge Jury
Instruction 11 as vague and ambiguous. As with the preceding claims, determining prejudice
under Strickland requires this Court to review the merits of the claim. Because this claim raises
a legal challenge, this Court conducts a de novo review. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250.
Instruction 11 failed to define the future danger or "propensity to murder" aggravating
circumstance in a constitutional manner. The instruction stated:
The phrase "exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably
constitute a continuing threat to society" means conduct showing that the
defendant is more likely than not to be a continuing threat to society. The state is
required to prove the existence of this propensity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such finding cannot be based solely upon the fact that you found the defendant
guilty of murder. In order for a person to have a propensity to commit murder,
the person must be a willing, predisposed killer, a killer who tends toward
destroying the life of another, one who kills with less than the normal amount of
provocation. Propensity requires a proclivity, a susceptibility, and even an
affinity toward committing the act of murder.
R. 152.
Dunlap recognizes the prior decision of this Court approving this language, but raises this
issue to preserve it for review. Creech v. State, 105 Idaho 362, 370-71, 670 P.2d 463, 471-72
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(1983). This instruction is vague and ambiguous, fails to adequately narrow the class of
murderers eligible for the death penalty, and insufficiently channels the jurors' sentencing
discretion in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifth,
Sixth and Eighth Amendments.
The phrase "less than the normal amount of provocation" is undefined, ambiguous and
confusing. It allows the jury unfettered discretion and encourages the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because it is reasonably likely that
a juror would interpret the phrase "normal amount of provocation" to justify or lessen the degree
of the homicide, it is reasonably likely that a juror would exclude from the class of first degree
murderers those who killed with the "normal amount of provocation." Thus, the use of the
phrase "one who kills with less than the normal amount of provocation" likely was understood to
mean one who commits a first degree murder. Accordingly, the instruction fails to narrow the
class of first degree murderers eligible for the death penalty in any respect in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1988)
(aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally broad or vague if it does not channel or limit the
sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,877 (1983)
(aggravating circumstances must "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty" in a way that reasonably 'justif1ies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder"). The aggravating circumstance violates
the Eighth Amendment.
The inclusion of the vague and ambiguous phrase "less than the normal amount of
provocation" in the definition relieves the jury of determining beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of the "propensity" aggravating circumstance, which is the functional equivalent of an
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element of the offense, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002) (aggravator functional equivalent of element); Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952) (removal of element from jury violates right to jury trial). Submitting
the cause to the jury on this flawed definition violates Dunlap's right to a properly instructed
jury. See e.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 379-80 (1990) (instructing jury to convict on
impermissible legal theory is reversible error) (citing to Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 567,
571 (1970)).
In the PCR court below, the court assumed the validity of the instruction in part because
it is an approved Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction ("ICJI") of the Idaho Supreme Court. R. 2270.
This is a case of first impression litigating jury instructions written to fill the void left by the
elimination of judge sentencing in capital cases post-Ring. That the instructions have been
previously approved does not automatically render them constitutional. Like any presumption,
the presumption that the ICJI instructions are correct may be rebutted, as Dunlap has done.
Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275,281 (1999) (rebutting common law presumption); Politte v.
Department of Trans., 126 Idaho 270,271 (1994) (rebutting statutory presumption), Idaho
County Nursing Home v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 124 Idaho 116, 117-18 (1993)
(same), Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473,477 (1993) (same).
The PCR court found that appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise this
issue. R. 2270-71. Relying on the notion that winnowing issues is evidence of competence on
appeal, and that Dunlap had not pointed the court to clearly weaker issues, the court rejected the
claim. The PCR court erred. As set forth repeatedly in prior sections of the brief, Dunlap did
point the court to a clearly weaker issue in his briefing below. He informed the court that an
issue raised by appellate counsel was foreclosed under Ross v. Oklahoma. R. 2236-37. See
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supra at 14-15, 22-23. Accordingly, the PCR court's assertion that no weaker issue had been
disclosed, R. 2271 n. 11, is simply incorrect. Because this is a clearly stronger, winning issue,
appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising it.

E. Ex Post Facto and Due Process Challenges to Sentencing Determination
Dunlap challenged Instruction 14 and the verdict form as violating the Ex Post Facto and
Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. The PCR court rejected this claim. The
court found the instruction, based upon a statutory amendment, was merely procedural, not
substantive. R. 2276-78. Because the changes to Idaho Code § 19-2515(3), are substantive, the
PCR court erred.
Instruction 14 and the verdict form improperly instructed the jury on the sentencing law,
LC. § 19-2515, that applied at the time of the resentencing proceeding, rather than the law that
applied at the time of the crime and entry of Dunlap's guilty plea. 7 See R. 157 (Jury Instruction
14) and R. 159-61 (Jury Verdict Form). The statutory version of LC.§ 19-2515 in effect at the
time of Dunlap's offense and plea was more favorable, and imposed a greater burden of proof on
the State with respect to the finding and weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The failure to instruct on the earlier version of the statute violated the Ex Post Facto and Due
Process Clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
At the time of Dunlap's offense and plea, LC. § 19-2515(c) (Michie 1984) provided:
(c) Where a person is convicted of an offense which may be punishable by death,
a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court finds at least one (1)
statutory aggravating circumstance. Where the court finds a statutory aggravating
circumstance the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds

Recognizing that Dunlap was subject to the version of LC. § 19-2515 in effect at the time of his
offense, the State specified that it was "using the language of the statutory aggravating factors
contained in LC. § 19-2515 that existed at the time of the crime, entry of the plea and original
sentencing." R. 163-65.
7
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that mitigating circumstances which may be presented outweigh the gravity of any
aggravating circumstance found and make imposition of death unjust.

Id. (emphasis added) (the "offense statute").
The version of I. C. § 19-2515(3 )(b) (Michie 2006) in effect at the time of Dunlap's
resentencing, and applied by the Court in this case, provided as follows:
Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant shall be
sentenced to death unless mitigating circumstances which may be presented are
found to be sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust. The
jury shall not direct imposition of a sentence of death unless it unanimously finds
at least one ( 1) statutory aggravating circumstance and unanimously determines
that the penalty of death should be imposed.

Id. (emphasis added) (the "resentencing statute").
The statute in effect at the time of Dunlap's resentencing further provided that at the
conclusion of the presentation of evidence and arguments in mitigation and aggravation, the jury
must return a special verdict stating:
(i) Whether the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; and
(ii) If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed against the
aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty
would be unjust.
LC. § 19-2515 (8)(a)(Michie 2004).
Under the offense statute the State had to show not only that a death sentence was not
"unjust," but more significantly, that the mitigating circumstances did not "outweigh the gravity
of any aggravating circumstance found." LC. § 19-2515(c) (Michie 1984). Under this statute,
when the mitigating circumstances "outweigh" the aggravating circumstance, death may not be
imposed. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320,325,806 P.2d 413,418 (1990) ("If the trial court finds
that the mitigating circumstances presented outweigh each statutory aggravating circumstance
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found, the imposition of the death penalty would be unjust."). Under the resentencing statute this
latter requirement was eliminated.
The PCR court focused upon a questionable possibility that a jury might find death
unjust, even when the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh each aggravating circumstance.

R. 2277. The statute applied at Dunlap's resentencing provided only that once a statutory
aggravator had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, if mitigating circumstances were
presented, weighed against each aggravator and found to be "sufficiently compelling" such that
the imposition of death would be unjust, then death would not be imposed. According to the
PCR court, this language allowed Dunlap's jury to find that even if the mitigating evidence was
outweighed by the aggravating circumstance, that the mitigating evidence might still be
"sufficiently compelling" to make the imposition of death unjust. Thus, the PCR court found
that the new statute did not impose a more onerous standard for avoiding the punishment of
death.
The PCR court ignored the substantive benefit of the prior law, the converse proposition
that when mitigating circumstances did outweigh the aggravator, that death could not be
imposed. See Sivak, 119 Idaho at 325. Under the court's interpretation, a jury could give death
under the new statute, merely by finding that death would not be unjust even when the mitigators
outweighed the aggravators. This was a substantive change in the law to the State's benefit and
Dunlap's detriment.
The change in the statute to require a showing that the mitigating circumstances are
"sufficiently compelling to make imposition of death unjust" unmoored the standard for death
from whether or not the mitigating circumstances "outweigh" the aggravating circumstances.
While the fact-finder under the new statute might find mitigating circumstances "sufficiently
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compelling" to make death unjust even when the aggravating circumstance outweighs the
mitigating circumstance, that is merely a more lenient result under the new statute which
therefore does not violate the ex post facto clause. The new statute violates the ex post facto
clause because it can also result in increased punishment on Dunlap, who could not have been
sentenced to death under the old statute when the mitigating circumstances outweighed the
aggravating circumstance, but may be sentenced to death in those circumstances under the new
statute if the fact-finder finds nevertheless that the mitigating circumstances are not sufficiently
compelling to make death unjust.
The PCR court also found that no ex post facto violation exists because the change in the
statute was merely procedural. R. 2278. The court relied upon State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73,
77-78, 90 P.3d 298 (Idaho 2004). R. 2277.
Lovelace merely addressed the ex post facto argument that Ring effected a substantive
change in the law by transforming statutorily defined aggravating circumstances into elements of
the offense. This Court dispensed with this attack by stating that the "revised death penalty
scheme only provides new procedures for determining the aggravating circumstances redefined
as the functional equivalent of elements of capital murder of which Lovelace had notice."
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 78, 90 P.3d at 303. Lovelace did not address substantive statutory
changes that altered the facts and quantum of proofrequired for imposition of the death penalty.
The PCR court erred in extending it to the issue raised here.
The application of the new statute at Dunlap's resentencing violated the prohibition
against ex post facto laws. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). The elimination
of the prior Idaho law's provision, that death is unjust when the mitigating evidence outweighs
the aggravating circumstance, deprived Dunlap of a "defense available according to law at the
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time when the act was committed," and therefore "is prohibited as ex post facto." Beazell v.
Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925), quoted in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,292 (1977). See
also State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 165-67, 627 P.2d 788, 794-896 (1981) (repealing
corroboration requirement in sex crime cases but holding that to apply the repeal to an analysis
of the defendant's conviction "would be the equivalent of applying an ex post facto law, and is
within the prohibitions of Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 16 of our
Idaho Constitution").
The new version of the sentencing statute imposed a lesser burden on the State, and
allowed the State to obtain a death sentence on evidence that would not have been sufficient to
allow a death sentence under the statute in effect at the time of Dunlap's offense. The statute
applied at Dunlap's resentencing imposed a higher burden upon defense counsel to avoid a death
sentence in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellate
counsel erred in not raising this clearly stronger, winning issue and omitting the weaker issue
foreclosed by Ross.

V.

CONCLUSION
Dunlap has demonstrated that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of

counsel. Numerous meritorious claims were omitted while a clearly foreclosed claim was
presented to this Court. There is a reasonable probability of a different result of the appeal but
for those errors. The sentence must be vacated and Dunlap is entitled to a new sentencing trial
with competent counsel. Alternatively, the summary dismissal should be vacated and the matter
remanded for further proceedings in the district court or any such other relief deemed appropriate
by this Court.
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Respectfully submitted this 14th day , f April 2014.

I
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